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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper we address the timing of a group decision which is taken by weighted voting
under a qualiﬁed majority rule. Decision-making in our model is in two stages. In the
second stage, players vote on a restriction on behavior (to limit a negative externality).
Before that, in the ﬁrst stage, players vote to determine the timing of the second-stage
vote: whether it should be “early”, before the players’ types are revealed, or “late”, after
types become common knowledge. Player types aﬀect their cost of complying with the
restriction. The restriction applies symmetrically to all players in the group and we do not
(initially) allow for side payments between players.
The job of a social planner in this setting would be straightforward. Independently of
the social welfare function, the planner would wait and pick the optimum restriction after
player types are realized. However, in this paper we do not consider the social planner’s
problem and focus instead on positive issues. Under a late vote, then, players use their
voting power to swing the second-stage group decision to serve their revealed interests. As
a consequence voting on the restriction late may be inferior to the group than voting early.
A central feature of our model is its ability to distinguish the consequences of the
power and the size of players. In the model power is measured by a player’s voting
power, and size by its impact on the group surplus. We show that, under a late vote the
expected utility of a player increases in her voting power. By contrast, under an early
vote players unanimously agree on the restriction and obtain the same expected utility. In
stage 1, therefore, “powerful players” are inclined to choose to vote late on the restriction,
while the less powerful tend to choose to vote early. By contrast, if players have equal
power, large players have lower expected utility under a late vote than small players. The
1“spillovers” implied by adjustments of large players are high, which implies that if they
e n du pi nal o s i n gc o a l i t i o nt h ew i n n e r sw i l lg e n e rally select a restriction which necessitates
more adjustment than if the losing coalition has (more) players of smaller size. Therefore,
players tend to drag their feet when their power is suﬃcient to outweight the eﬀect of their
possibly larger size.1
Under an early agreement the parameters for policy are chosen under uncertainty re-
garding how the policy will work out for the individual players. In empirical terms, this
can take the form of a binding agreement or contract signed at the time of substantial
uncertainty regarding its distributional consequences. By contrast, late agreements mean
delay until players have learned where they stand. A diﬀerent, but sometimes related,
interpretation of early agreement is the choice to delegate powers to an independent exec-
utive body. For example, in the European Union (EU) the Council of Ministers (the EU’s
most important legislator) could decide early by delegating powers to the European Com-
mission (the executive) at the time the distributional consequences of doing so are unclear.
According to this interpretation one prediction of this paper is that the powerful tend to
be less interested in delegation than the weak: although the mandate of the executive may
not always be what the weak bargain for, delegation guarantees symmetric enforcement at
the moment the information regarding types has come in.2,3
The result that the powerful procrastinate, whereas the less powerful do not, may
1The value of the qualiﬁed majority threshold matters for the early-versus-late trade-oﬀ as well: high
values pose a problem in terms of weak agreements under a late vote. This makes early commitment more
attractive.
2There are two underlying assumptions here, namely (1) the delegation decision must be diﬃcult to turn
around, and, related, (2) the executive must be suﬃciently independent; if individual players — particularly
powerful players — have too much leverage over the decisions of the executive, the weak can be wary of
delegating powers. Magnette and Nicola¨ idis (2005) argue that at the inception of the European Economic
Community its three small member states had doubt about the independence of the Commission and
insisted on establishing a Council in which all six member states retained a veto in most policy areas.
3While in our model the information regarding types is not used under early decisions, the discussion in
Section 5.2 clariﬁes further this is not a crucial assumption. Thus, even if delegation involves discretionary
power it counts as an early decision provided the executive is immune from political pressure of the players.
2explain the stylized fact that inﬂuential countries are generally more reluctant to sign
multilateral agreements than “small states”.4 In Section 5.1 we review evidence from
the literature on International Relations which is consistent with our results, as well as
evidence from literatures on corporate governance, EU governance, and the economics of
oil extraction.
The above-mentioned results are obtained in a context of voting with a given qualiﬁed
majority threshold (QMT). But how is the QMT determined if players have a veto at
the outset? We study two alternative ways to address this question. In the ﬁrst we add
a stage prior to the two legislative stages. In this prior stage players decide whether to
give up their veto in exchange for a given QMT. This decision resembles the situation of
EU member states when they decide to surrender national competence in a certain “new”
policy area. In the second extension we modify the ﬁrst of the two legislative stages of
our main model. In the modiﬁed stage 1 players take the early-late decision jointly with
the decision on QMT. This decision resembles what Hammons (1999) called the decision
between a “lengthy, statute-oriented constitution” (decide early) and a “short, framework-
oriented constitution” (decide late plus choose its QMT) and also resembles the choice
between a “complete social contract” and an “incomplete social contract” (Aghion and
Bolton (2003) and Roland (2005)). To brieﬂy preview the results, the ﬁrst extension fails
to explain why players ever jointly give up their vetoes if their powers diﬀer substantially,
while the second can explain this (although there are multiple equilibria). The second
extension also sheds light on some of the intrinsic diﬃculties of constitutional negotiations
if players anticipate power diﬀerences under “reasonable” constitutional templates (as in
4Much energy in the International Relations literature is devoted to deﬁning the concept of a “small
state”, with suggested classiﬁcations ranging from those based on population, area, economic output to
those based on “psychological” conditions, such as the feeling of powerlessness (see Neumann and Gst¨ ohl
(2004) and the citations therein). Some of this literature distinguishes between small states and weak
states, much as we here distinguish between power and size.
3the recent Iraqi constitutional negotiations).
There is a sizable literature that uses concepts of coalitional game theory to derive and
apply measures for the power of individual players in the context of weighted voting (see
Owen (1995), Felsenthal and Machover (1998), or Benoit and Korhauser (2002) for excellent
reviews). In a recent paper Snyder, Ting, and Ansolabehere (2005) compute the voting
power of voters that play a non-cooperative bargaining game.5 Our paper is not concerned
with computing the voting power of individual players, but it focuses on the implications
of a setting in which players have diﬀerent voting power. Persson and Tabellini (2003)
also study the policy implications of given constitutional regimes, however, they do not
draw a link between constitutions and the preference of players regarding the timing of
decisions, which we address in this paper. Harstad (2005) studies the implications of the
constitutional regime — particularly the qualiﬁed majority threshold — for the incentive of
players to invest prior to the decision moment.
In some circumstances the model exhibits ineﬃcient delay: on average parties would
beneﬁt from deciding early, which the powerful refuse to permit. Private information is
the source of delay in Alesina and Drazen (1991) (in a war-of-attrition context), Bolton
and Farrell (1990) (in a grab-the-dollar game), and Admati and Perry (1987) and Harstad
(2007) (in signalling games). In our model information is symmetric and costly delay
occurs because the distribution of beneﬁts from an agreement changes over time (with the
revelation of types).6 The ineﬃciency arises not because of delay per se, as there is no
discounting, but from the parties unequal ability to protect their interests in the ex post
weighted vote.
5Another branch of the literature on weighted voting has focused on rationalizing the use of diﬀerential
voting weights (e.g. Penrose (1946), Nitzan and Paroush (1982), Shapley and Grofman (1984) and, more
recently, Felsenthal and Machover (1999) and Barber` a and Jackson (2006)).
6Side payments (to the powerful) at the early-late decision would prevent possible costly delay. (Side
payments at the time the restriction is chosen would not.) The role of side payments is clariﬁed in Section
5.5.
4The next section presents the model. In Sections 3 and 4 we derive the expected payoﬀs
of players under an early and a late vote on the restriction. In Section 5 we discuss our core
assumptions, state the model predictions, and discuss their evidence. Section 6 presents
the two alternative extensions to endogenize the qualiﬁed majority threshold and embeds
the analysis into the relevant literature afterwards. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix
contains the proofs of Propositions 2-4.
2T h e m o d e l
Consider a set of n players N = {1,...n} who take a joint decision to ﬁxarestriction
r ∈ [0,1] which caps the players’ behavior e δi,i∈ N. Such a restriction is relevant if high
realizations of individual behavior result in a negative externalities on the other players.
This is the case here. We consider a “common pool problem” in which lower individual
behavior has a positive eﬀect on the group beneﬁts V , but generally increases the player’s
privately carried adjustment costs Ci as well. We assume for simplicity that players receive
certain (exogenous and known) shares τi of V , and that the adjustment costs of players
are proportional to the shares τi as well, and depend on the distance between their chosen
behavior and their types δi, i ∈ N. Speciﬁcally, each player i has the following utility
function
Ui(e δ1,...,e δn)=τiV (e δ1,...,e δn) − Ci(e δi,δi)=τi
h
V (e δ1,...,e δn) − c(
¯ ¯ ¯e δi − δi
¯ ¯ ¯)
i
(1)
In this equation the function c is the common factor of the adjustment costs of players.
Observe that the assumption that adjustment costs are proportional to τi simpliﬁes the
model because it ensures that τi becomes irrelevant to the choice of a player. This as-
sumption would apply, for instance, if the players each represent groups of agents, say the
citizens of nations, which share equally in the beneﬁts V and carry equal amounts of the
adjustment costs.
5We assume the partial derivatives of V are all negative, reﬂecting that higher individual
behavior implies a negative externality. Adjustment costs are assumed continuously dif-
ferentiable, increasing, and convex: c0 > 0a n dc00 ≥ 0. We assume types are generated by
independent draws from a uniform distribution on the unit interval: δi
i.i.d. ∼ Uniform[0,1]
for all i ∈ N. After types are revealed they are common knowledge. Finally, we assume that
it is not in the interest of any individual player to unilaterally provide the group beneﬁt
b yc h o o s i n gh e rb e h a v i o rb e l o wh e rr e a l i z e dt y p e
Assumption 1 (No private provision of public good) For all players i and all e δ =( e δ1,...,e δn)
satisfying e δi < δi we have
V (e δ1,...,e δn) − c(δi −e δi) <V(e δ1,...,e δi−1,δi,e δi+1,...,e δn) − c(0)
Since choosing behavior higher than type also lowers utility (it lowers V plus leads to
adjustment costs), Assumption 1 implies that the preferred behavior of a player of type δi
ise δi = δi. In other words, a player’s type δi represents her preferred behavior if unrestricted
by r. A similar argument shows that under a policy restriction r players choose individual
behavior as follows
e δi = e δi(r,δi)=m i n {r,δi} i ∈ N (2)
Players choose e δi = δi unless δi >r ,in which case players satisfy the restriction in the
cheapest possible way (by choosing e δi = r).
We now turn to decision-making. Players make two collective choices prior to choosing
individual behavior. In Stage 2, the players choose the restriction r. Before that, in Stage
1, the players choose the timing of the second-stage decision: whether it should be “early”,
i.e. before the players’ types are revealed, or “late”, i.e. afterwards. Both early and late
decisions on the restriction are nonrenegotiable, thus we will speak of early commitment
and late commitment. A good interpretation of early commitment is that it represents the
6decision to delegate powers to an executive body. To be sure, the delegation decision must
be diﬃcult to reverse and the executive body be relatively immune to ex post pressure of
the players. This is often the case, and, in fact, we know from the literature on central
banks that one rationale for delegation is precisely to commit to the policy decision. Figure
1 displays the timing of the game.
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Figure 1: Timing of decisions
Group decisions are reached through weighted voting. The voting game is γ =( q;w1,...,wn),
in which wi represents the voting weight of player i ∈ N,a n dq the qualiﬁed majority
threshold.7 We assume that q>1/2
P
i∈N wi to ensure that the voting outcome is well
7As in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) the voting game γ =( q;w1,...,wn)i sd e ﬁned by the
simple coalitional game (N,vγ) where the value function vγ, deﬁn e do nt h es e to fs u b s e t sS of N, is such
that vγ(S)=1i f
P
i∈S wi ≥ q (the decision is “accept”) and vγ(S) = 0 otherwise (“reject”). Some results
in the paper refer to voting power, which we deﬁne as in Shapley and Shubik (1954):
φi(γ)=
X
S⊆N\i
s!(n − s − 1)!
n!
[vγ(S ∪ i) − vγ(S)]
Here s = |S| is the cardinality of S (the number of players in S). In words, the Shapley-Shubik index of
ap l a y e ri is given by the fraction of coalitions that are losing coalitions without i, but become winning
coalitions if i joins (such that vγ(S ∪ i) − vγ(S) = 1). A greater voting weight is a necessary, but not
suﬃcient, condition for a player to have more voting power than another player.
7deﬁned. In Stage 1 players simultaneously cast a vote on the proposal “early commitment”.
Early commitment applies if the aggregate voting weight of the yes-voters meets or exceeds
q, while late commitment prevails otherwise.
The stage-2 game is as follows. The default policy restriction before Stage 2 is rd =1 , i.e.
there is no binding agreement. Players sequentially propose alternative policy restrictions
and each player gets the chance to propose a policy restriction at least once. If a player
decides to make a proposal r during her turn, it must be more “drastic” than the current
default, i.e. the proposals must satisfy r ∈ [0,r d]. Each proposal r is put to a vote and if it
gets accepted it becomes the new default policy restriction. The chosen policy restriction
is the prevailing default policy restriction after the last player’s turn.
3 The early commitment case
Assume temporarily that the group has chosen “early commitment” in Stage 1 and focus on
the Stage 2 choice of the restriction r. Recall from Figure 1 that under early commitment
the restriction is chosen before types δ =( δ1,...,δn) are picked by Nature. Thus in Stage
2p l a y e r sc h o o s er so as to maximize their expected utility. Speciﬁcally, since the shares τi
do not aﬀect choice they have the following indirect utility functions over r:
W
EC
i (r)=v(r) −
Z 1
r
c(δi − r)dδi for all i ∈ N (3)
Here v(r) ≡ Eδ
³
V (e δ(r,δ))
´
denotes the expected beneﬁts induced by the restriction r.
Equation 3 shows that players have identical preferences over r. The Stage 2 voting
game has therefore a trivial outcome under early commitment. The player that gets to
make the proposal ﬁrst advances the restriction that maximizes WEC
i (r), call it rEC.A l l
players vote in favor of the proposal rEC and no stricter r is proposed in the other voting
8rounds, so that the outcome of the stage-2 voting game is r = rEC.8
Under early commitment each player receives the same expected utility up to a scale
factor τi, that is they receive the same (scaled) payoﬀ πEC ≡ WEC
i (rEC). We have obtained
Proposition 1 Under early commitment the policy restriction rEC is chosen, where rEC
solves v0(r)+c(1−r)=0 . All players receive the same expected utility up to a scale factor
τi, that is, they obtain the same (scaled) payoﬀ πEC = WEC
i (rEC).
The result in Proposition 1 suggests that agreement is “easy” if negotiations take place
ex ante. This result ﬁnds support in evidence by Libecap and Wiggins (1985) on oil ﬁeld
unitization agreements, i.e. decisions to exploit oil ﬁelds as single units to curb over-
exploitation as the consequence of a common-pool problem9. Libecap and Wiggins show
that in Wyoming, where regulation encouraged unitization agreements at the initial stages
of exploration, unitization agreements governed between 50 and 85 percent of the state’s
annual oil production in the period 1948-1975. This was considerably more than on oil ﬁelds
in Oklamoma and Texas, where unitization negotiations took place after the exploration
and development stage of oil ﬁelds. In Oklahoma unitization agreements governed between
9 and 38 percent, and in Texas between 0 and 20 percent, of the annual oil production in
the period 1948-1975.
4 The late commitment case
In the late commitment case, players know the vector of types δ =( δ1,...,δn)d u r i n gt h e
Stage 2 game. The chosen restriction r under late commitment is therefore in general a
8An optimum policy restriction rEC exists because WEC
i (r) is continuous in r. However, the ﬁrst-order
condition for an optimum, i.e. v0(r)+
R 1
r c0(δi − r)dδi =0⇒ v0(r)+c(1 − r)=0 , may have multiple
solutions, and, indeed, there may be more than one optimal policy restrictions. Since our interest is in the
timing of the choice of the restriction, and not with the magnitude of the restriction per se,l e tu sa s s u m e
that rEC =m i n {r∗ ∈ argmaxr πEC(r)). With this reﬁnement rEC is uniquely deﬁned.
9For geophysical reasons, the more wells drilled into a single oil ﬁeld, the lower is the total recovery.
9function of the realized types. Below we ﬁrst solve the Stage 2 game under late commit-
ment. As we shall see, the chosen restriction corresponds to the restriction favoured by the
“pivotal player”. After solving the Stage 2 game under late commitment we will compute
each player’s expected payoﬀ under late commitment.
4.1 The chosen policy restriction under late commitment
Recall that the default restriction before the Stage 2 voting game is rd = 1 (“no binding
agreement”) and that players propose alternative restrictions in some predetermined order.
Under late commitment the players’ indirect utility functions over the restrictions are given
by:
W
LC
i (r;δ)=V (min{r,δ1},...,min{r,δn}) − c(δi − min{r,δi})f o r a l l i ∈ N (4)
Unlike in the early commitment case, players have diﬀerent indirect utility functions under
late commitment because their realized types δi are diﬀerent. In particular, the restrictions
favored by the players diﬀer.
Although WLC
i (r;δ) may not have a derivative in the points r = δi,i=1 ,...,n, the
left-hand derivative exists on the entire interval r ∈ (0,1]. S i n c ep l a y e r sa r eo n l ye v e r
interested in lowering r, we can meaningfully speak of ﬁrst-order conditions. We assume
for simplicity10 that for each player i a n de a c hr e a l i z a t i o nδ the function WLC
i (r;δ)h a sa
single peak which is given by the ﬁrst-order conditions following from equation 4.11 Denote
this peak or bliss point by r = r∗
i(δ).
10The proofs of our propositions, and their intuition sketched in the text, exploit single-peakness, but
we can prove each result without this assumption.
11Multiple peaks in preferences could arise in theory for certain V when r is below a player’s type. This
would happen for particular δ if lowering r would lead to adjustment of a suﬃciently large mass of players
that have an impact on V that dominates the cost increase locally.
10It is straightforward to show that the bliss points are situated to the left of the player’s
type, that is, we have
r
∗
i(δ) ≤ δi for all i (5)
Bliss points are never located to the right of a player’s type δi because a laxer policy would
increase the behavior of the players with types located to the right of δi. This would lower
the gross surplus V , hence lower the payoﬀ of the pivotal player, because adjustment costs
play no role if r∗
i(δ) > δi. A player’s bliss point may be located to the left of a player’s type
(r∗
i(δ) < δi) despite the fact that such a restriction would imply adjustment costs incurred
by the player. This is because tightening the policy restriction decreases the negative
externalities from players located to the right of the player. These externalities plus the
contribution to V of the player itself may locally exceed the player’s adjustment costs.
It is also straightforward to show that the ordering of the bliss points of players is
identical to the ordering of the players’ types. In other words, players of lower types have
lower bliss points for all realizations of types δ =( δ1,...,δn):
δi < δj ⇔ r
∗
i(δ) <r
∗
j(δ)f o ra n yp l a y e r si and j
We solve the game under the assumption that players make sincere proposals,t h a ti s ,
players propose their bliss points r∗
i(δ) whenever these lie to the left of the current default
restriction. This assumption makes sense given that players know each others’ types and
bliss points when deciding late. With this assumption a result resembling the Median
Voter Theorem applies: the chosen policy restriction corresponds to one favoured by the
pivotal player. In this context, the pivotal player is the player of the lowest type among
the players for which their voting weight plus the voting weight of players with types to
their left, adds up to, or exceeds the qualiﬁed majority threshold q.12
12Formally, let Sr be the set of players with types lower than r, i.e. Sr = {i ∈ N : δi ≤ r} and WSr the
s u mo ft h ev o t i n gw e i g h t so ft h ep l a y e r si nSr, i.e. WSr =
P
i∈Sr wi. The pivotal player is the player, say
p,d e ﬁned by WSr ≥ q for r = δp but WSr <qfor all r<δp.
11Lemma 1 The chosen policy restriction under late commitment corresponds to the pre-
ferred policy restriction of the pivotal player, that is, if player p is the pivotal player for
a given realization of types δ =( δ1,...,δn), then the chosen policy restriction under late
commitment is r = r∗
p(δ)=a r gm a x r WLC
p (r,δ).
Proof. An equilibrium voting strategy for all players is to vote against all proposals
located to the left of their own bliss point, and for proposals that are either equal to, or
to the right of their bliss point. This constitutes the proof because if players adopt this
strategy the chosen policy restriction indeed becomes r = r∗
p(δ).
In general the parameters of the voting game γ and the functional forms of V and c
determine the bliss point of the pivotal voter and therefore the chosen restriction under
late commitment. In particular, higher values of the qualiﬁed majority threshold q imply
higher values of the chosen restriction. In the extreme case that q =
P
i∈N wi,a l lp l a y e r s
have a veto and no binding agreement is reached ex post. In this case the player of the
highest type is pivotal and will set the restriction equal to her type (or any level higher
than her type) such that no player faces adjustment costs. In reality this situation may
take the form of a weak agreement (e.g. mere lip service, a joint declaration of ﬁdelity) that
does not bind any party to a costly action, or “contractual breakdown” between players.
Weak agreements for high q arise because of our assumption that adjustment costs are
privately carried. This assumption rules out side payments between players that would be
needed to convince players of high types to agree to a binding late agreement. Examples
where partial or full contractual breakdown happened in standard common pool problems
are Karpoﬀ (1987) in the case of ﬁshery regulation and Libecap and Wiggens (1985) for
oil ﬁeld unitization decisions in the period 1948-1975 in Texas where unitization decisions
required unanimous agreement among the oil ﬁrms.
124.2 The expected utility under late commitment
At Stage 1 players do not know the realization of types δ (see Figure 1). Each player
thus assesses the merits of late commitment in terms of its payoﬀ (scaled expected utility).
Equations 4 and Lemma 1 show that the payoﬀ of late commitment is given by
π
LC
i = EδV (min{r
∗
p(δ),δ1},...,min{r
∗
p(δ),δn}) − Eδ[c(δi − min{r
∗
p(δ),δi})] (6)
Ap l a y e r ’ sp a y o ﬀ equals the expected group beneﬁts minus the expected adjustment cost.
Observe that the expected group beneﬁt is equal for all players, while, as we will show
below, the expected adjustment cost generally diﬀers across players.
The remainder of this section is devoted to establishing three results regarding the
payoﬀs of players under late commitment. The ﬁrst states that if players are of equal
size (in terms of their contributions to V –w ew i l ld e ﬁne this below), then the players’
expected payoﬀ is strictly increasing in their voting power (Shapley-Shubik index — see
footnote 7). The second and the third results apply if players are not of equal size. The
second result states that the expected payoﬀ of a player is again strictly increasing with
h e rv o t i n gp o w e ri ft h ei m p a c to nV of the set of players in the potential losing coalitions
is small relative to the adjustment costs of the potential pivots (such that their bliss points
correspond to their type: r∗
p = δp). The ﬁnal result states that if two players that diﬀer
in size have equal voting power then the largest player of the two has the lowest payoﬀ
(unless, for all potential pivots p we have r∗
p = δp, in which case the payoﬀsa r ee q u a l ) .W e
discuss the empirical predictions that follow from these three results in the next section.
Before presenting the results, let us deﬁne some useful terminology. Deﬁne for any
realization δ its permutation δ
0 as follows: δ
0 =( δ
0
1,...,δ
0
j,...,δ
0
i,...,δ
0
n)w h e r eδ
0
j = δi and
δ
0
i = δj and δ
0
k = δk for all k 6= i,j. That is, in δ
0 the location of the types of i and j are
permuted and the location of all other types is identical. Deﬁne for any vector of behavior
e δ its permutation in the same way. Next deﬁne what it means for two players to be of
13“equal size” and what it means if one is “larger” than the other.
Deﬁnition 1 (Equal Size) Two players i and j are of equal size if V (e δ)=V (e δ
0
) for any
chosen vector of behavior e δ and its permutation e δ
0
.
Deﬁnition 2 (Larger / Smaller) For any two players i and j we will say that i is larger
than j (j is smaller than i)i f
(a)
∂V (e δ)
∂e δi
<
∂V (e δ
0
)
∂e δj
for any e δ and its permutation e δ
0
,a n d
(b)
∂V (e δ)
∂e δk
≤
∂V (e δ
0
)
∂e δk
any player k and e δ such that e δi > e δj
Deﬁnition 2 expresses that i is larger than j if she (a) has a stronger (i.e. more negative
– recall that the partials of V are negative) marginal impact on V than j would have had,
had j been in i’s position, and (b) higher positions of i weakly increase the marginal eﬀect
of reductions in behaviour of others. Observe that if two players are not of equal size then
it is not necessarily so that one is larger than the other.
The ﬁrst proposition applies if players are of equal size but diﬀer in their voting weight.
Proposition 2 Consider two equally-sized players i and j and assume i has a greater
voting weight (wi >w j). (a) The payoﬀ of player i is weakly higher than that of player j,
that is: πLC
i ≥ πLC
j . (b) If player i has more voting power than player j, then the payoﬀ of
player i is strictly higher than that of player j,t h a ti s :πLC
i > πLC
j .
Keeping size constant, the expected payoﬀ of a player increases with its voting power
because more voting power implies that the chosen restriction is generally located closer
to the player’s type. Even if a player is not pivotal herself, a yes-vote with more voting
power generally has a stronger tightening eﬀect on the chosen restriction, while a no-vote
with more voting power generally has a stronger relaxing eﬀect on the chosen restriction.
14When players are not of equal size, larger players face potentially larger adjustment
costs because of their greater inﬂuence on group beneﬁts. This is because the restriction
chosen by the pivotal player generally depends on the size of the players above her. Recall
from equation 5 that the bliss points of players are either located to the left of their types,
i.e. r∗
i(δ) < δi, or identical to their types, i.e. r∗
i(δ)=δi. Tightening the policy restriction
slightly from δi leads to a marginal increase in V stemming from an adjustment of behavior
of player i plus adjustments of the players with higher types. If this marginal increase in V
initially exceeds i’s privately carried adjustment cost we have r∗
i(δ) < δi and the distance
between r∗
i(δ)a n dδi increases with the sizes of the players above her. The larger the
combined eﬀect of the players of higher type on group beneﬁts, the greater is the level of
adjustment costs a pivotal player is willing to incur itself to reduce the behavior of those
above it.
When considering players of equal size, as in Proposition 2, this eﬀect is absent by
deﬁnition. However, there are are other circumstances in which it plays no role, for instance
if the potential bliss points of pivotal players coincides with their types independently of the
composition of the losing coalition. Such corner solutions r∗
p(δ)=δp happen if the pivotal
player has players to its right whose adjustments merely have a “small” impact on V while
adjustment costs are “substantial”. The qualiﬁed majority threshold q is important here
since higher q generally means there are fewer players in any losing coalition. In fact, it
is always true that r∗
i(δ)=δi for some s e to fp l a y e r s .F o rt h ep l a y e ro ft h eh i g h e s tt y p e ,
m say, tightening the restriction from δm does not lead to any adjustment of others, so
r∗
m(δ)=δm (see assumption 1). We have r∗
p(δ)=δp for all potential pivots p (and hence
no impact of larger size on expected adjustment costs) under the following condition:
Assumption 2 (Externalities Dominated by Costs) The functions V and c and the qual-
iﬁed majority threshold q are such that for any potential realization δ, and its correspond-
15ing pivotal player p,l o s i n gc o a l i t i o nS,13 and equilibrium behavior if r = δp (namely,
e δi =m i n {δp,δi} for all i), we have:
−
∂V (e δ)
∂e δp
−
X
k∈S
∂V (e δ)
∂e δk
− c
0(0) < 0
The next proposition invokes Assumption 2 to argue that more powerful players obtain
ah i g h e rp a y o ﬀ than less powerful players, even if players are not of equal size. The intuition
behind this is again that a potential “no-vote” of a powerful player i generally leads to a
greater shift to the right of the chosen restriction than a no-vote of a less powerful player j.
This implies that the expected adjustment cost of a powerful player is lower than for a less
powerful player. Size now does not matter because r∗
p(δ)=δp, such that the adjustment
costs of a player in a losing coalition just depend on her type, and not her size.
The crucial step for computing the expected adjustment costs term if r∗
p(δ)=δp is
the observation that a player i only incurs an adjustment cost if her type δi is located
to the right of the player that would be pivotal in a voting game with all players but i,
but in which it takes the same number of votes — namely q — to pass a proposal as in
the game γ. In other words, denoting the “game without i”b yγ−i,a n dt h el o c a t i o no f
the corresponding pivot by δ
γ−i
p ,w eh a v et h a tp l a y e ri incurs an adjustment cost only if
δi > δ
γ−i
p . If we had δi < δ
γ−i
p then either player i or a player to her right would be pivotal
in the game γ, so that player i would satisfy the policy restriction without having to incur
any adjustment cost.
This reasoning shows that if the pivot in the game without player i were given,t h e
expected adjustment cost would be
1 R
δ
γ−i
p
c(δi−δ
γ−i
p )dδi. However, from an ex ante perspective
t h ep i v o ti nt h eg a m ew i t h o u tp l a y e ri is random and follows a certain distribution, call it
13That is δk > δp ⇔ k ∈ S.
16Fδ
γ−i
p . Therefore, the expected adjustment cost of a player is given by
Eδ[c(δi − min{δp(δ),δi})] =
1 Z
0


1 Z
r
c(δi − r)dδi

dFδ
γ−i
p (r)( 7 )
We show in the proof of the next proposition (Appendix B) that Fδ
γ−i
p (r) <F δ
γ−j
p (r) for all
r ∈ (0,1) if player i has more voting power than j.14 This shows that πLC
i > πLC
j because
the term EδV in equation 6 is identical across players.
Proposition 3 Consider any two players i and j and assume i has a greater voting weight
(wi >w j). Assume externalities are dominated by costs (Assumption 2). (a) The payoﬀ
of player i is weakly higher than that of player j,t h a ti s :πLC
i ≥ πLC
j . (b) If player i has
more voting power than player j, then the payoﬀ of player i is strictly higher than that of
player j,t h a ti s :πLC
i > πLC
j .
Our ﬁnal result shows that if two players have equal voting power, then the expected
payoﬀ under late commitment is generally the lowest for the largest player. This is a
direct implication of the phenomenon that pivotal players expose larger players to tighter
restrictions; that is, it requires that Assumption 2 is violated. For this logic to apply it
must be true that both players can end up in a losing coalition, i.e. neither has a veto.
Proposition 4 Consider two players i and j and assume that i is larger than j. If i and
j have equal voting power, and if there exists a potential realization δ and corresponding
pivotal player and losing coalition S such that (1) i ∈ S and (2) −
∂V (e δ)
∂e δp −
P
k∈S
∂V (e δ)
∂e δk −
c0(0) > 0 if e δi =m i n {δp,δi} for all i (i.e. Assumption 2 is violated, the impact of some
losing coalition with i is not “small”), then πLC
i < πLC
j , that is, the payoﬀ of the largest
player is the lowest.
14That is, the distribution of δ
γ−i
p stochastically dominates the distribution of δ
γ−j
p .
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5.1 Empirical predictions
Proposition 1 above shows that the payoﬀ of early commitment is identical across players,
while Propositions 2-4 show that the payoﬀ of late commitment generally depends positively
on the relative power of a player and negatively on the size of the player. In reality
the preference as to early or late commitment of players depends on the speciﬁcs of the
functions V and c, as well as on the qualiﬁed majority threshold q and any ex ante available
information regarding (ex post) preferences (including any knowledge on anticipated cross-
correlations among players — see Section 5.4). If variations in V, c and any potential
information regarding preferences can be treated as “random noise” in the context of this
paper, our model yields the following empirical predictions.
Prediction 1 Assume the group has no veto players, i.e. for all players i we have q<
P
j∈N\{i} wj. (a) Keeping their size ﬁxed, players are more (less) likely to favor late com-
mitment the greater (smaller) is their power. (b) Keeping their power ﬁxed, players are
more (less) likely to favor late commitment the smaller (greater) is their size.
Depending on the balance between asymmetries in voting weights and their impacts on
group beneﬁts, individual players may prefer either early or late commitment. When voting
weights diﬀer signiﬁcantly powerful players tend to want to delay policy choices because
of their greater leverage over the ex post decision, while less powerful players prefer the
symmetric treatment of early commitment. The prediction that large (high-impact-on-V )
players are more prone to commit early stems from Proposition 4, which shows that if large
players are in a losing coalition they tend to be exposed to strong actions on the part of
the winning coalition, while small players in a losing coalition are not.
We next review some evidence that is consistent with these predictions.
18Corporate governance. A recent literature studies the voluntary adoption of corporate
governance provisions by ﬁrms. In this context voluntary adoption of certain types of
corporate governance provisions can be viewed as early commitment by the ﬁrm. The
decision to adopt such provisions is formally taken by the shareholders but is generally
inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm’s executives as well. While a ﬁrm’s executives can be expected to
oppose the adoption of clear corporate governance rules since it limits their discretion,
the incentives of shareholders are less clear-cut and may depend on their power in the
shareholder meetings according to Prediction 1a. In a sample of 748 decisions of Canadian
ﬁrms regarding voluntary adoption of corporate governance provisions, Anand, Milne, and
Purda (2006) show that ﬁrms are less likely to adopt the Canadian corporate governance
guidelines if a member on the executive board of a ﬁrm holds more than 10 percent of
the shares, or if the ﬁrm has a majority shareholder. Klapper, Laeven, and Love (2005)
analyze a sample of 224 Eastern European ﬁrms and focus on the decision of these ﬁrms
to include in their corporate charter two particular corporate governance provisions on
shareholder voting. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms with a majority shareholder are less likely to
adopt these provisions than ﬁrms without a majority shareholder. However, the presence
of block shareholders that are not majority shareholders makes it more likely that these
provisions are adopted.
International Relations. There is a long-standing interest in the study of “small states”
in international relations.15 In this context “small” is usually deﬁn e di nt e r m so fp o w e r .
Our model points out that although ex post the interests of small states may well diverge
greatly, they may nevertheless pursue similar interests from an ex ante point of view. For
example, our model supports the observation that small states are generally in support
15See e.g. Keohane (1969), Amstrup (1976), Katzenstein (1985), or Ingebritsen, Neumann, Gstohl, and
Beyer (2006).
19of furthering legalization of international organizations16, i.e. precise codiﬁcation and im-
partial third-party adjudication of rules: early commitment. The prediction that small
states favor early commitment is also supported by a statement of Koﬁ Annan that small
states “... are the very glue of progressive international cooperation for the common good.”
(Annan (1998)).
During the American constitutional convention in 1787 multiple coalitions formed, dis-
solved and reformed as the issues under consideration evolved. Subsequent scholarship has
debated the source of the framers’ diﬀering viewpoints. Some argue that the positions
taken were based on diﬀering conceptions of what constitutes a “good republic,” while
others point to the personal interests (largely ﬁnancial) of the founders themselves. Jillson
and Eubanks (1984) argue that both these motives played a role, and that the dominant
motive depended on the issue under consideration. They classify issues as either “high
level”, involving “constitutional design issues” such as the term of appointment of judges
or whether the executive should be an individual or a council; and “low level” operational
decisions, such as how the seats in the legislature will be apportioned. Though Jillson and
Eubanks demonstrate that coalitions among states shifted in the course of the convention,
it seems less clear that these issues can be classiﬁed so easily as principled or operational.
After all, legislative apportionment can also be taken as a principled decision, with various
rationales oﬀered for equality of states or proportional representation. Our model suggests
a classiﬁcation of issues based on information. What Jillson and Eubank’s termed “low
level” issues were ones for which individual state interests have already been revealed, i.e.
involving late commitment. Here, with all states maintaining a veto, negotiations were dif-
ﬁcult (as Jillson and Eubanks clearly show). By contrast, “high level” decisions dealt with
issues where adjustment costs remained unknown, thus early commitment. Jillson and
16See e.g. Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane, and Slaughter (2000)
20Eubanks show these issues were the ﬁrst broached because those in charge of the agenda
recognized that agreement would be more easily reached.
European Union governance. Prediction 1a is also consistent with the observation in
the European Union (EU) that the member states with high voting weight (e.g. France,
Germany, Italy, and the UK) generally prefer to place responsibility for decisions with
the Council of Ministers, where decisions are reached through weighted voting, while low-
weight member states typically prefer policy to be delegated to the Commission, the EU’s
executive.17 Schure and Verdun (2006) show that the three member states in the Euro-
zone with the highest voting weight, namely France, Germany and Italy, were in favor
of including open-ended statements during the recent reform of the Stability and Growth
Pact, while several “small” member states were explicitly opposed, and pushed for a set
of “clear rules”. They argue that by including open-ended statements the high-weight
member states sought to enhance the discretionary role for the Council in “enforcing” the
Pact, while “small” member states tried to curb the discretionary role for the Council.
The unitization of oil ﬁelds. Prediction 1b is supported by the studies of Wiggins and
Libecap (1985) and Libecap and Wiggins (1985) on oil ﬁe l de x p l o i t a t i o nw h of o u n dt h a t
small oil ﬁrms preferred to delay or permanently frustrate oil ﬁeld unitization agreements.
They also found that their power as a group explained how successful they were in achieving
delay.18
17See, for example, Moravcsik and Nicola¨ idis (1999) or Magnette and Nicola¨ idis (2005). Although the
Council formally decides by weighted voting, decisions are typically reached by “consensus”. This fact
does not contradict that the voting weights matter for the consensus decision that emerges (Golub, 1999).
18The failure of unitization negotiations in Texas represent the cleanest example of Prediction 1b because
unitization agreements were taken by unanimity there, such that the oil ﬁrms diﬀered in size but had
identical power. On the other hand, it could also be argued that oil ﬁrms are not quite behind a veil of
ignorance when they choose whether to unitize early or late. Wiggins and Libecap argue that small ﬁrms
knew ex ante that their ex post incentives to cut back drilling intensity to the socially desirable level are
generally less strong, that is, their types tended to be higher. This eﬀect would reinforce the desire of
small ﬁrms to unitize late despite the vast loss in revenue from the oil ﬁeld.
21Wiggins and Libecap (1985) suggest that asymmetries of information (e.g. regarding
bottom hole pressure and remaining oil reserves) across ﬁrms bargaining for unitization
agreements were the cause of contractual breakdown in oil ﬁeld unitization agreements.
However, Libecap and Wiggens (1985) explain that “... during exploration there is little
asymmetric information across bargaining parties ... (p.692)” which makes early unitiza-
tion agreements “easy”. Since, as they also argue, early unitization is a far more eﬃcient
arrangement than late unitization, they leave unanswered the question as to why unitiza-
tion agreements fail in an unregulated environment (see Libecap and Wiggens, 1984). Our
model points to the incentive of some ﬁrms (and land owners) to drag their feet (and their
political power as a group) as a possible cause of the breakdown of unitization agreements.
While all parties were aware of the beneﬁts of unitization for the group, ﬁrms may have
disagreed about the timing of unitization negotiations because the distribution of the ex-
pected beneﬁts of an agreement varied with time. Of course, as in all political economy
models, side payments between players could have undone this eﬀect. Thus, our answer is
incomplete and leaves unexplained the transaction costs between the negotiating parties.
5.2 Delegation and the value of information
A disadvantage of early commitment in our model is that the information regarding types
is not considered when setting the restriction. This is problematic if the costs of neglecting
this information are substantial. In the model this happens for instance if the cost function
c has a relatively high curvature. In this case the chosen restriction under early commitment
would be “high”, and ineﬃciencies arise, for instance, if most or all players have low type
realizations.
In realistic settings there is the possibility to delegate a policy to an agency, and to grant
the agency discretionary power. This avoids the costs of not using the information, but at
22the potential costs that the agency is not fully independent and can be manipulated by
the players, particularly the powerful ones. If the agency is immune to political pressure
of the players, then delegation with discretion is to be viewed as early commitment. If
independence of the agency is not feasible then delegation with discretion resembles late
commitment.
The International Criminal Court is a case of delegation with discretion, however its
degree of independence is unclear as yet. It is a court, thus an actor immune to political
pressure in its intent. However, its eﬀectiveness depends crucially on the eﬀort of parties
to prosecute others and abide by its decisions. According to each of these two viewpoints,
the reluctance of the US to join in is understandable in light of our model. As a powerful
state the US is not prone to give up its power and commit early by abiding by the decisions
of an independent court. However, the reluctance of the US is also understandable even
if setting general standards of behavior does not imply equal treatment. While ex post
voting rights mean little in a court, prosecution eﬀorts are crucial. As a large player, the
US fears it would be unduly exposed to asymmetric treatment and vindictive prosecution
as Prediction 1b makes clear.
5.3 The role of the qualiﬁed majority threshold
An implication of Lemma 1 is that the value of q matters to the players’ proposals in the
late commitment game and for the winning restriction in particular. For high q the pivotal
player has little incentive to tighten the restriction below its type, as the spillovers from
reductions in behavior by the players of higher type are small. For lower values of q these
spillovers can be signiﬁcant, and the pivotal player may choose to incur substantial costs
herself to further curtail the behavior of higher types.
In the extreme, when q =
P
k∈N wk the procedure requires unanimity. Late commit-
23ment is then not threatening because each player can veto policy choices and protect their
revealed interests. On the other hand, such opportunism poses a problem in terms of weak
agreements that do not bind any party to a costly action. In anticipation of this sterility, or
even failure, any hope for mutual gain will come from early commitment, i.e. agreements
before self-interest is fully revealed. Thus, when we see any agreement at all, we expect to
see early commitment.19
The fear of breakdown can be a strong incentive to continue bargaining. The US Con-
stitutional Convention of 1787 serves as an illustration. At various times, stalemates were
averted only because the delegates worried about the consequences of failure. Madison
(1787) puts the problem of ex post disagreement in clear relief in the opening line of the
Federalist Number 10: “Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed
Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and
control the violence of faction.” This argument worked to convince even the most wary
delegates of the need for a vigorous eﬀective government, and raised a specter useful at sev-
eral later times in the convention to negotiate compromises (for example, the Connecticut
Compromise that ensured the power of state delegates would be proportional to the state’s
population in one house and equal in a second house, and when states were permitted to
maintain slavery).
5.4 Correlations in types
In the proofs above, the assumption that players’ types are drawn independently plays
an important role. In reality it is possible that certain subsets of players can anticipate
that their types will correlate, so that these players form a natural coalition. Moving away
19Note however that in our model the group beneﬁt function does not value standardization per se.I f
coordination on a single level of the policy variable desirable, such as may be the case for a (horizontal)
product standard, it is possible that bargaining in a forum with veto players yields beneﬁts.
24from independence of type realizations would complicate the proofs, and also make it more
diﬃcult to identify “weak players”. For example, on some issues it is reasonable to assume
that Canada forms a natural coalition partner with the US. Thus, looking ahead to a late
commitment vote, Canada would not consider itself in as much jeopardy as it would were
types uncorrelated.
This suggests that were we to relax the independence assumption the principal loss
would be empirical content. The theorems would go through, once the power measure
was corrected to account for the expected natural coalitions. Canada might show up as
a large player on several issues, only because in expectation it will form a coalition with
others with suﬃcient power. In general, however, there is not always a simple way for an
investigator to identify a set of natural correlations.
5.5 Side payments
So far we have assumed that utility is not transferable. Side payments could play a role
both at the early-late decision as well as when the restriction is chosen. In the latter
case, if the restriction is chosen early, symmetry amongst the players makes side payments
irrelevant. However, if players choose the restriction late, side payments are another route
for the powerful to extract surplus from the weak. During the early-late decision, therefore,
the powerful already anticipate receiving more side payments than the less powerful, so that
the prediction that the powerful drag their feet still holds. One diﬀerence when allowing
for side payments when the restriction is picked is that the late decision on the restriction
will be eﬃcient (the Coase Theorem applies).
If side payments are allowed at the early-late decision as well, the Coase Theorem applies
once more. The eﬃcient decision is to choose “late commitment”, since late decisions on
the restriction are eﬃcient. The voting outcome itself will now no longer reveal preferences
25as to early and late commitment, but the direction of the side payments will. In general
t h ep o w e r f u lw i l lp a yt h ew e a k .
6 Extensions
6.1 From veto to voting
In our model the voting weights w and the qualiﬁed majority threshold q are exogenous.
One justiﬁcation for this assumption is that the commitment decision is taken against a
backdrop of an existing constitutional template, i.e. institutionalized values of q and w.F o r
example, at the subnational level various interest groups (e.g. states or provinces within a
federation, or political parties with predetermined legislative voting weights) may be faced
with a constitutional template in which all decisions must be made. The model identi-
ﬁes characteristics that predict the players’ stances on adoption of laws under subtantial
uncertainty regarding its distributional consequences, or delegation to an administrative
board versus maintaining legislative control. Another example would be decisions of the
shareholders of a corporation subject to regulation and possibly the ﬁrm’s statutes.
An alternative justiﬁcation for treating the constitutional template as exogenous is
that q and w do not represent explicit constitutional parameters, but rather the “informal
power” of the players. Some players may be dominant as the result of economic or military
power. Diﬀerences in the informal power of players may persist even when, nominally,
everyone holds a veto, or players have equal (formal) voting weights. Sometimes, these
explicit requirements are not capable of constraining the inﬂuence of dominant players and
power relationships may change over time, even if the formal weights do not. As in the
previous interpretation, the template is thus ﬁx e d .H o w e v e ri ti sl e s sa p p a r e n ti nt h i sc a s e
how the power of players might be measured, or how to draw the distinction between size
26and power, so that the model may lose empirical content.
These apologies for our exogeneity assumpt i o na r em o r ep e r s u a s i v ei nt h ec a s eo ft h e
voting weights w than the threshold q, because even if voting weights represent diﬀerences
in informal power, it is unclear how q is determined. For the rest of this section, we discuss
how players might have arrived at a q. We proceed in two steps. In the current subsection
we discuss when players are willing to give up their veto in exchange for a given q.I nt h e
next subsection we analyze a situation in which players have yet to determine the qualiﬁed
majority threshold should they decide to commit to a policy late.
Assume the weights of players are given and that q = q0 =
P
k∈N wk, i.e. each player
currently has a veto. Consider the decision to adopt a given template q1 <
P
k∈N wk.
This situation may for example describe the choice of ﬁrms considering a merger, or the
choice of sovereign states whether to address a “new” issue at the national level, or at the
international level through an existing constitutional venue such as the United Nations or
the WTO. This choice is also recurrently made by member states of the European Union
(EU). Does the matter fall under EU jurisdiction or not? Or, does the Council of Ministers
formally decide by unanimity or qualiﬁed majority voting. Both these cases involve a
change to an existing Treaty, which requires unanimous approval of all 27 member states.
Assume for simplicity that there are just two weights, low and high, and that late
commitment with q = q0, i.e. contractual breakdown, is inferior to early commitment for
all players. Finally, assume that the power diﬀerence between low-weight and high-weight
players is substantial enough that low-weight players prefer early commitment under q1,
while high-weight players prefer late commitment.
There are two general cases to consider depending on the combined weight of the low-
weight players. If the combined weight of the low-weight players exceeds q1 then players
are indiﬀerent between retaining their veto power and relinquishing it. Under q = q0 early
commitment prevails because (by assumption) all players have an interest in avoiding late
27negotiations and contractual breakdown. However, once players agree to q = q1 low-weight
players will also impose early commitment on the group. In the case that low-weight
players are collectively too weak to force early commitment under q1, they are not willing
agree to give up the unanimity rule q0.U n d e r q1 high-weight players would successfully
drag their feet, while under q0 the threat of chaos after types are known induces all players,
large and small, to opt for early commitment.
In summary, we began by studying the choice between the unanimity rule and qualiﬁed
majority voting, which takes place before the decision to commit early or late. We found
that this choice is irrelevant if low-weight players dominate under qualiﬁed majority vot-
ing, and that unanimity persists if they do not. Either way, in the end the policy choice
becomes early commitment. Our main model has shown that the less powerful players have
a tendency to favor early commitment in the context of a given constitutional template.
This ﬁrst extension suggests that when it comes to giving up sovereignty in exchange for
a “reasonable” constitutional template it is less clear that small players are the frontrun-
ners. Amstrup’s (1976) report that small German states were the main hurdle to German
uniﬁcation in the 19th century are in support of this outcome. However, the result is of
course tentative and calls for further investigation.
6.2 Endogenizing the qualiﬁed majority threshold
In this section we endogenize the qualiﬁed majority threshold q by changing stage 1 of the
g a m ed e s c r i b e di nF i g u r e1 .S p e c i ﬁcally, we consider the situation that in stage 1 players
take the early-late decision jointly with the decision on q. This decision resembles what
Hammons (1999) called the decision between a “lengthy, statute-oriented constitution”
(early commitment) and a “short, framework-oriented constitution” (late commitment with
a q). The setting also has a close resemblance with the choice between a “complete so-
28cial contract” and an “incomplete social contract” as in Aghion and Bolton (2003) and
Roland (2005), because a complete social contract would not involve voting, while voting
or authority is essential under an incomplete social contract.20
As in the previous subsection, assume players are either high-weight or low-weight.
Denote a generic high-weight player by the index i and a low-weight player by j. Assume
again that policy decisions require unanimous consent by the players prior to negotiations:
q = q0 =
P
k∈N wk. Players either choose r = rEC, i.e. the optimal restriction under early
commitment, or they pick the qualiﬁed majority threshold q<
P
k∈N wk which will govern
a future (late) decision on r. For simplicity, consider just three values for q, namely: q0
(the current default); qveto i <q 0 (which is such that i retains its veto, but j not); and
q1 <q veto i (which is such that no individual player retains its veto). An outcome q = q0
means constitutional negotiations fail; q = qveto i that the voting rules of, for example,
the UN Security Council apply; and q = q1 that all players voluntarily surrender their
sovereignty over the policy decision.
Observe that, in a sense, the lower q is the more “drastic” is the constitution, since lower
q means individual players give up more control over the policy choice. Early commitment
r = rEC is the most drastic in this respect because players give up their leverage over the
implemented policy completely. We will assume that players each propose a constitutional
template simultaneously and non-cooperatively, and that the adopted constitution is the
least drastic among them.21 We will also concentrate on the non-trivial case in which (1)
early commitment dominates failure for all players, i.e. πEC > π
q0
i = π
q0
j , and (2) the power
20The resemblance is not perfect. Observe that the restriction r in our model is by construction also
incomplete contract because it is not contingent on the state of nature and subjects all players to the same
arrangement.
21This assumption ensures that disagreement among players does not necessarily imply failure of the
constitutional negotiations, while, at the same time, each player has the chance to retain her veto. In reality,
sovereign parties involved in constitutional negotiations often disagree on the preferred constitution, yet
agree on certain aspects at the same time.
29diﬀerence between low-weight and high-weight players is substantial enough to make low-
weight players prefer early commitment and high-weight players late commitment under
q1, i.e. πEC > π
q1
j and πEC < π
q1
i . We restrict the analysis to equilibria in pure strategies,
and assume that players of identical voting weight choose identical strategies.
Let us ﬁrst point out that the game has a trivial Nash equilibrium, namely one in
which both types of players choose to keep their veto, i.e. (q0,q 0). We will omit any further
discussion of this equilibrium because it is unlikely that constitutional negotiations fail due
to a coordination problem. Observe also that powerful players have a dominant strategy,
namely either to propose q1 (if π
q1
i > π
qveto i
i )o rqveto i (if π
q1
i < π
qveto i
i ) .T h ep r e s e n c eo fa
dominant strategy for high-weight players rules out early commitment, even if low-weight
players dominate the high-weight players under q1. Notice the sharp contrast of this result
with the outcome of the game of the previous subsection that predicted early commitment.
Since powerful players have a dominant strategy the constitutional game has an equi-
librium. However, the equilibrium may be “failure”. This result is perhaps surprising
given our assumption that early commitment dominates failure. It highlights the intrinsic
diﬃculties of constitutional negotiations if power is asymmetrically distributed across play-
ers under “reasonable” constitutional templates. If the dominant strategy of high-weight
players is q1, failure of the constitutional negotiations happens if π
q1
j < π
q0
j . Low-weight
players anticipate being tyrannized by the majority too often under q1 such that failure,
however painful, is a more attractive option. The existence of this equilibrium may explain
several diﬃculties in the US constitutional negotiations. One important divide between
the states was based on power. “Small states” feared to be pushed aside too often in fu-
ture legislative decisions (see e.g. Farrand, 1958). The Connecticut Compromise resolved
the deadlock by the creation of a bicameral system with each state obtaining 2 seats in
one house irrespective of size. Thus, in terms of our model, the resolution was to change
the voting weights of states, diminishing the power diﬀerence between states. For “large
30states” relinquishing some power was a more attractive option than failure.
If the dominant strategy of high-weight players is qveto i failure can also happen. If
π
qveto i
j < π
q0
j the low-weight players block the powerful’s favorite constitution qveto i, because
with their vetoes too little would remain on the table for the low-weight players. It is
intuitive that qveto i is more likely to be rejected by the low-weight players if there are
many high-weight players, because this implies the high-weight player of the highest-type
is usually pivotal. Eﬀectively, then, low-weight players have no voting power. On the other
hand, a high-weight player’s payoﬀ under qveto i also tends to be small if they are many.
Thus, with many high-weight players it is likely that π
q1
i > π
qveto i
i , that is, surrendering
sovereignty is likely the dominant strategy for them.
In summary, if this model of the decision between a “lengthy, statute-oriented constitu-
tion” and a “short, framework-oriented constitution” adequately describes constitutional
negotiations, early commitment cannot prevail even in the presence of many low-weight
players. With just a few high-weight players the high-weight players are unlikely to be
keen on surrendering their vetoes. For low-weight players qveto i may or may not be pro-
ductive enough compared to the alternative, i.e. failure. With many high-weight players
surrendering sovereignty is likely the dominant strategy for powerful players. Low-weight
players essentially now choose to take or leave q1.22 The possibility of failure in a model
with a Pareto-improving constitution, namely rEC, sheds light on the intrinsic diﬃculties of
constitutional negotiations in the face of anticipated power diﬀerences under “reasonable”
constitutional templates. The recent Iraqi constitutional negotiations form an example of
this situation.
By 1987 all EU member states had ratiﬁed the so-called Single European Act (1985-
87). By ratifying the Act all EU member states had given up their vetoes regarding all
22The theoretical option that qveto i suits them best is unlikely because with many large players the
payoﬀ of qveto i is likely close to the payoﬀ of failure.
31decisions pertaining to the formation of the Single Market. Thus, member states committed
to an open-ended process of market reforms to be decided upon by weighted voting in the
Council that goes on to date. The model in the previous subsection could not explain why
EU member states, particularly small member states, could ever agree to signing the Single
European Act. While simplistic, the model of this subsection is rich enough to explain this
major step in the European integration process.
6.3 Endogenizing the qualiﬁed majority threshold: the literature
Endogenizing the qualiﬁed majority threshold has a long history in the literature. A
standard result is that a higher qualiﬁed majority threshold reduces the risk of “cycles”
when voting on the policy decision. Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1988) prove that a qualiﬁed
majority threshold of 64 percent ensures that the equilibrium voting outcome corresponds
with the preferred voting outcome of the median-voter for a large class of voter preferences
and a large number of voters. By construction we do not face the problem of cycles in our
model.
In Harsanyi (1953, 1955) a risk-neutral “impartial observer” prefers a system with equal
voting weights and the simple majority rule. An increase in the degree of risk aversion to
become part of the losing minority increases the qualiﬁed majority threshold. Aghion
and Bolton (2003) show that the optimal qualiﬁed majority threshold increases with the
expected cost of compensating the losing minority ex post. In their model a group of players
chooses the qualiﬁed majority threshold “behind a veil of ignorance” (Rawls (1971)). Under
a veil of ignorance the group’s problem corresponds to the “planner’s problem” considered
in Harsanyi.
In this paper we lifted the veil of ignorance in one speciﬁcd i m e n s i o n :e xa n t ep l a y e r s
know their ex post power and size. We show that as a consequence players generally
32prefer diﬀerent choices for the qualiﬁed majority threshold. This is one explanation why
bargaining on the voting rules (constitutional bargaining) is often fraught with political
economy considerations.23
Finally, in Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004) the choice for q represents the optimal
degree of delegation of discretionary power to politicians, and in Dal Bo (2006) the optimal
degree of commitment to a policy, respectively. Messner and Polborn (2004) explain why
identical citizens may favor a higher qualiﬁed majority threshold with respect to decisions
to change the voting rules than with respect to legislative decisions. In Barstad (2005)
t h ec h o i c eo fq induces the optimum level of investment that players make prior to the
legislative choice. Maggi and Morelli (2006) point to the importance of the interaction
b e t w e e nt h ec h o i c eo fq and the diﬃculty of enforcement of the choices it governs. Barber` a
and Jackson (2004) investigate which constitutions, and q’s in particular, survive over time
given that decisions to alter them are governed by the prevailing constitutions itself.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have studied collective decisions in which the aim is to agree on a policy
that restricts the behavior of all individual group members. Such a setting is relevant in
case the behavior of individual players involves externalities on the other players.
We show that if players have diﬀerent voting weights, the powerful players have a greater
incentive to vote on the restriction after they learn their type. Late decisions expose all
players to the possibility to be tyrannized by the majority, however this happens less
frequently to powerful players who therefore have a higher expected payoﬀ from dragging
their feet than less powerful players. Less powerful players will more likely prefer to vote on
23Another is that players have signals of their ex post preferences during constitutional decisions, as in
Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004), Messner and Polborn (2004), or Barber` a and Jackson (2004, 2006).
33the restriction upfront as this serves as an insurance policy against ex post opportunistic
behavior of the powerful. We found that greater size tends to reduce the payoﬀ of a late
decision because it generally makes for tighter restrictions if the player ends up being in a
losing coalition. Players tend to drag their feet when their power is suﬃcient to outweight
the eﬀect of their possibly larger size.
The result that the powerful drag their feet is consistent with observations from a
variety of areas and we have discussed examples from corporate governance, international
relations, and European Union governance. The result that greater size of a player reduces
her incentives to vote to delay is consistent with several papers on the exploitation of oil
ﬁelds. A full-scale empirical investigation of our model awaits future research.
T h ee x i s t i n gl i t e r a t u r eo nc o l l e c t i v ed e c i sion-making assumes the decision moment is
ﬁxed while our paper relates weighted voting to the preference of players regarding the
timing of decisions. As we have shown the timing of decisions becomes relevant if players
learn about the distributional consequences of decisions over time. In reality group deci-
sions only take place when somebody has set the agenda. Seen from this angle our theory
predicts that a player with a small voting weight is more active in advancing agenda items
that force the group to vote. This can explain for example why the “small” EU member
states were so adamant that the EU keep its rotating presidency in the European Conven-
tion which produced the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in July 2003
(Magnette and Nicola¨ idis (2005)).
A caveat of our study is that we have maintained the assumption that the restriction is
identical for each player. In multilateral negotiations this assumption is often satisﬁed, but
there are also exceptions and sometimes “some animals are more equal than others”. The
Non-proliferation Treaty is a striking example of an asymmetric restriction, recognizing
ﬁve states as the oﬃcial nuclear powers as of 1 January 1967, and imposing on all other
signatories restrictions that aim at preventing them from developing a nuclear weapon
34arsenal.
We have also assumed full commitment to the restriction in our model. In a context
of limited commitment it can be expected in the logic of our model that powerful players
more often agree ex ante to a given restriction than our model predicts, to challenge the
agreement ex post.
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39A Proof Proposition 2
Proof of statement (b). Any diﬀerence between the payoﬀs of players must come in through
ad i ﬀerence in their expected adjustment costs, because EδV is common to all players.
Hence, we must show that Eδc(δj − min{r∗
p(δ),δj}) >E δc(δi − min{r∗
p(δ),δi}). We show
this below by proving that r∗
p0(δ
0) ≤ r∗
p(δ)a n dr∗
p0(δ
0) <r ∗
p(δ) with positive probability.
Consider an arbitrary realization δ and its permutation δ
0. Observe that the choice
of δ is arbitrary, and that both δ and δ
0 have the same probability density. Let p be
the index of the pivotal player for the realization δ and p0 the index of the pivotal player
for δ
0. The chosen restriction associated with δ (namely r∗
p(δ)) and δ
0 (namely r∗
p0(δ
0)) are
identical unless possibly if (1) i = p,( 2 )δj < δp < δi, or (3) δi < δp < δj. This also means
that, unless in one of these cases, the adjustment costs of i under δ are identical to the
adjustment costs of j under δ
0.
If δj < δp ≤ δi (i.e. if δj < δp = δi or case (2) applies) then switching the positions
of i and j increases the voting weight below player p. This implies δ
0
i ≤ δp0 ≤ δp and
δ
0
i ≤ δp0 < δp with positive probability, hence r∗
p0(δ
0) ≤ r∗
p(δ)a n dr∗
p0(δ
0) <r ∗
p(δ)w i t h
positive probability.
If δi ≤ δp < δj (i.e. δi = δp < δj or case (3)) then switching the positions of i and j
increases the voting weight above player p. This implies δ
0
j ≤ δp ≤ δp0 and δ
0
j ≤ δp < δp0
with positive probability, hence r∗
p(δ) ≤ r∗
p0(δ
0)a n dr∗
p(δ) <r ∗
p0(δ
0) with positive probability.
Statement (a) is implied by (b) because voting weight and voting power are related as
follows: (i) if player i has more voting weight than player j, then i h a sa sl e a s ta sm u c h
voting power as j, that is: wi >w j ⇒ φi ≥ φj; and (ii) if player i has more voting power
than player j, then i must the largest voting weight, that is: φi > φj ⇒ wi >w j.
40B Proof of Proposition 3
As in the proof to Proposition 2 we only need to prove statement (b) because it implies
statement (a). Equations 6 and 7 show that any diﬀerence between πLC
i and πLC
j must
come in through a diﬀerence in the distributions Fδ
γ−i
p (r)a n dFδ
γ−j
p (r). We prove this
below by showing that Fδ
γ−i
p (r) <F δ
γ−j
p (r)f o ra l lr ∈ (0,1), that is, the distribution of δ
γ−i
p
stochastically dominates the distribution of δ
γ−j
p .
Let Fδ
γ−i
p (r) be the distribution function of the type of the pivot in the “game without
i” (i.e. the game γ−i =( q;w1,...,wi−1,wi+1,...,wn)) and Fδ
γ−j
p (r) the distribution function
of the type of the pivot in the “game without j”. The formulas of these distributions are
given by equation 18 in the next appendix. We would like to prove that Fδ
γ−i
p (r) <F δ
γ−j
p (r)
for all r ∈ (0,1). The proof is based on the observation that among the set of all coalitions
without players i and j (i.e. T ⊆ N \ i \ j) there are some losing coalitions that could
become a winning coalition with the support of the wi votes of a powerful player i,b u t
remain a losing coalition with the support of the wj votes of a less powerful player j.B e l o w
we will ﬁrst rearrange the equations for the Shapley-Shubik power index of players i and
j, and the formulas for the distributions of Fδ
γ−i
p (r)a n dFδ
γ−j
p (r). We use these equations
to next prove Fδ
γ−i
p (r) <F δ
γ−j
p (r) ⇒ φi(γ) > φj(γ)a n da f t e rt h a tt h er e v e r s e .
The Shapley-Shubik power index, deﬁned in footnote 7, can be rewritten as
φi(γ)=
Z 1
0
X
S⊆N\i
r
s(1 − r)
n−s−1 [vγ(S ∪ i) − vγ(S)]dr (8)
where s = |S| is the cardinality of coalition S. Deﬁne Gi(r) as the integrand of 8, and use
equation 18 to get
Gi(r)=
X
S⊆N\i
r
s(1−r)
n−s−1 [vγ(S ∪ i) − vγ(S)] =
X
S⊆N\i
r
s(1−r)
n−s−1vγ(S∪i)−Fδ
γ−i
p (r)(9)
41Now rewrite the summation to get
Gi(r)=
X
T⊆N\i\j
r
t+1(1−r)
n−tvγ(T∪i∪j)+
X
T⊆N\i\j
r
t(1−r)
n−t−1vγ(T∪i)−Fδ
γ−i
p (r)(10)
Here t = |T|, the cardinality of the coalition T. For player j we have a similar formula,
namely:
Gj(r)=
X
T⊆N\i\j
r
t+1(1−r)
n−tvγ(T∪i∪j)+
X
T⊆N\i\j
r
t(1−r)
n−t−1vγ(T∪j)−Fδ
γ−j
p (r)(11)
Subtracting these the last two equations yields
Gi(r)−Gj(r)=
X
T⊆N\i\j
r
t(1−r)
n−t−1 [vγ(T ∪ i) − vγ(T ∪ j)]−
h
Fδ
γ−i
p (r) − Fδ
γ−j
p (r)
i
(12)
Next, rewrite the formulas for the pivots without player i and player j by changing the
summation index:
Fδ
γ−i
p (r)=
X
S⊆NÂi
r
s(1 − r)
n−s−1vγ(S)= ( 1 3 )
X
T⊆N\i\j
r
t+1(1 − r)
n−tvγ(T ∪ j)+
X
T⊆N\i\j
r
t(1 − r)
n−t−1vγ(T)
Fδ
γ−j
p (r)=
X
S⊆NÂj
r
s(1 − r)
n−s−1vγ(S)= ( 1 4 )
X
T⊆N\i\j
r
t+1(1 − r)
n−tvγ(T ∪ i)+
X
T⊆N\i\j
r
t(1 − r)
n−t−1vγ(T)
We now turn to the actual proof. We ﬁrst prove that Fδ
γ−i
p (r) <F δ
γ−j
p (r) ⇒ φi(γ) >
φj(γ). Since Fδ
γ−i
p (r) <F δ
γ−j
p (r) we know from equations 13 and 14 that
X
T⊆N\i\j
r
t+1(1 − r)
n−tvγ(T ∪ j) <
X
T⊆N\i\j
r
t+1(1 − r)
n−tvγ(T ∪ i)( 1 5 )
This inequality shows that, among the set of all coalitions T without players i and j,
there are some losing coalitions, that continue to be losing if j enters the coalition (i.e.
42vγ(T ∪j) = 0), however become winning coalitions in case i enters (vγ(T ∪i) = 1). Dividing
both sides of inequality 15 by r, and rearranging, we get
X
T⊆N\i\j
r
t(1 − r)
n−t−1 [vγ(T ∪ i) − vγ(T ∪ j)] > 0( 1 6 )
The inequalities 16 and Fδ
γ−i
p (r) <F δ
γ−j
p (r) show that Gi(r) >G j(r) for all r (see expression
12) Since
R 1
0 Gi(r)dr = φi(γ)a n d
R 1
0 Gj(r)dr = φj(γ) we must therefore have φi(γ) > φj(γ).
We next prove φi(γ) > φj(γ) ⇒ Fδ
γ−i
p (r) <F δ
γ−j
p (r). First, deﬁne Gi(r)a n dGj(r)a s
above. Since φi(γ) > φj(γ)w eh a v e
R 1
0 [Gi(r) − Gj(r)]dr > 0. Substituting equations 13
a n d1 4i n t oe q u a t i o n1 2a n dr e a rranging the result we obtain
Z 1
0
X
T⊆N\i\j
r
t(1 − r)
n−t−1(1 + r)[vγ(T ∪ i) − vγ(T ∪ j)]dr =
Z 1
0
[Gi(r) − Gj(r)]dr
Next, since
R 1
0 [Gi(r) − Gj(r)]dr > 0a n drt(1 − r)n−t−1(1 + r) > 0f o r0<r<1t h e
equation above implies vγ(T ∪i)−vγ(T ∪j) > 0, i.e. there are some losing coalitions, that
continue to be losing if j enters the coalition, however become winning coalitions in case i
enters. Finally, from equations 13 and 14 we obtain that
Fδ
γ−i
p (r) − Fδ
γ−j
p (r)=r
X
T⊆N\i\j
r
t(1 − r)
n−t−1 (vγ(T ∪ j) − vγ(T ∪ i)) (17)
Since vγ(T ∪ i) − vγ(T ∪ j) > 0a n drt+1(1 − r)n−t−1 > 0f o r0<r<1w ec o n c l u d et h a t
Fδ
γ−i
p (r) − Fδ
γ−j
p (r) > 0f o r0<r<1.
C The distribution of the type of the pivot
By assumption the types of players δj,j∈ N are independent and uniformly distributed
on [0,1]. Therefore, if r were exogenous, Pr{δj ≤ r} = r would be the probability that a
player’s type is to the left of r. Similarly, the probability of obtaining a coalition S with
43players that vote “yes” to an exogenously picked r, and players outside S all vote “no”, is
given by:
Pr{S} =
Y
j∈S
Pr{δj ≤ r}
Y
j/ ∈S
Pr{δj >r } = r
s(1 − r)
n−s
Here s = |S|, the cardinality of the coalition S. The sum of votes cast in by a coalition S
is
P
j∈S
wj.I f
P
j∈S
wj ≥ q then S is a winning coalition, i.e. vγ(S)=1 ;o t h e r w i s eS is a losing
coalition.
Now deﬁne n independently distributed random variables wr
j,j=1 ,...nas follows:
w
r
j =

 
 
wj with probability r
0 with probability 1 − r
The probability to reach a majority on a certain proposal r is given by Pr
©Pn
1 wr
j ≥ q
ª
.
This probability depends on r, q,a n dw. The event
Pn
1 wr
j ≥ q, j ∈ S is identical to the
event vγ(S) = 1 and identical to the event “The type of the pivot is located to the left of
r”. The distribution function Fδp(r) (which represents the probability that the type of the
pivot is to the left of r) is hence given by:
Fδp(r)=
X
S⊆N
r
s(1 − r)
n−s · vγ(S)
Observe that Fδp(r)=0 ,Fδp(1) = 1 and that Fδp(r) is continuously increasing in r ∈ [0,1).
Deriving the distribution function of the pivot in the game γ−i in the same way gives:
Fδ
γ−i
p (r)=
X
S⊆NÂi
r
s(1 − r)
n−s−1 · vγ(S)( 1 8 )
Note that Fδ
γ−i
p (r) is also the conditional probability that the pivot in the game γ is located
before r given that player i votes against r.
44D Proof of Proposition 4
We need to show that the expected adjustment cost of i is larger than that of j,b e c a u s e
EδV is common to all players. Consider an arbitrary realization δ and its permutation δ
0.
Assume without loss of generality that δj = δ
0
i < δi = δ
0
j. Observe that the location of the
type of the pivotal voter, say δp,i si d e n t i c a lf o rδ and δ
0, because i and j have equal voting
power. (The index of the pivot is also the same, unless either i or j is the pivot, in which
case the index of the pivot switches).
Focus on the functions of r that express the group beneﬁts given the realization δ and its
permutationδ
0, say Vδ(r) ≡ V (min{r,δ1},...,min{r,δn})a n dVδ0(r) ≡ V (min{r,δ
0
1},...,min{r,δ
0
n}).
The (left-hand) derivatives of these two functions are identical for r ≤ δj = δ
0
i. But for
δj = δ
0
i <r≤ δi = δ
0
j we have V 0
δ(r) <V0
δ0(r)t h a ti s ,t h ed e r i v a t i v eV 0
δ(r) is more negative
(the eﬀect of a decrease in r is stronger under δ because it reﬂects a change in behavior of
the larger player — see Deﬁnition 2, equation a), and for r>δi = δ
0
j we have V 0
δ(r) ≤ V 0
δ0(r)
(see Deﬁnition 2, equation b)
B e c a u s ew eh a v eV 0
δ(r) <V0
δ0(r)f o rδj = δ
0
i <r≤ δi = δ
0
j we obtain from equation 4
that if δj = δ
0
i <r ∗
p(δ) < δi = δ
0
j and −
∂V (e δ)
∂e δp −
P
k∈S
∂V (e δ)
∂e δk − c0(0) > 0t h e nr∗
p(δ) <r ∗
p(δ
0).
Since, by assumption, these conditions are jointly satisﬁed with positive probability, we
have also in any case r∗
p(δ) <r ∗
p(δ
0) with positive probability, and r∗
p(δ)=r∗
p(δ
0)o t h e r w i s e ,
so that Eδc(δj − min{r∗
p(δ),δj}) <E δc(δi − min{r∗
p(δ),δi}).
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